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TAKING THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO COUNSEL SERIOUSLY
IN AMERICAN "CIVIL GIDEON" LITIGATION
Scott F. Llewellyn*
Brian Hawkins**
Courts have rejected a right to counsel for indigent civil litigants under the U.S.
Constitution. But in some American states, that right arguably already exists as a
matter of common law, albeit derived from centuries-old English common and
statutory law. This Article analyzes the viability of arguments for incorporating
the old English right to counsel in the twenty-seven American states that continue
to recognize old English common and statutory law as a source of binding author-
ity. Such "originalist" arguments may be appealing to judges who are more willing
to revive a historically based right than establish a new right based in concepts
such as due process.
INTRODUCTION
A recent study estimated that low-income households in the
United States face an average of three civil legal problems per
year,' generally without the assistance of counsel.2 To alleviate this
need, the "Civil Gideon" movement seeks to establish a right to
civil counsel for indigent civil litigants, similar to the right to crim-
inal counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright.3
California recently enacted legislation creating a civil right to
counsel in cases involving eviction, child custody, and domestic
abuse, but few other states have similar laws. Many Civil Gideon
proponents have thus attempted to persuade courts to create a
right to civil counsel under the federal constitution or a state con-
stitution. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, however, effectively foreclosed the
Partner, Morrison & Foerster LLP (Denver, Colorado).
Law Clerk to the Hon. Neil V. Wake, United States District Court for the District of
Arizona (Phoenix, Arizona).
The authors' views are their own and do not necessarily represent those of Morrison &
Foerster LLP or the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
1. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 9 (2007),
available at http://www.lsc.gov/justicegap.pdf.
2. See id. at 4.
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Assemb. B. 590, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (as amended in Assembly,
Mar. 12, 2009). See also Carol J. Williams, State Gives Poor a New Legal Right, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2009, at A8.
635
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
federal constitutional argument," and state supreme courts have
generally followed suit in interpreting their own constitutions. Ac-
cordingly, those seeking to establish Civil Gideon through
litigation have looked to other sources of law, including distant
sources such as international treaties, or even Magna Carta."
Ironically, of all the non-constitutional arguments for a court-
created Civil Gideon right, one of the most plausible may be
hardest to take seriously at first glance. In at least twenty-seven
states, the common law of England-and sometimes old English
statutes-remain enforceable so long as such law remains "appli-
cable" and has not been repealed by the legislature. The common
law of England and an old English statute provided a right to
counsel for indigent civil litigants. Assuming that the right remains
"applicable" and unrepealed, indigent civil litigants in such states
should have a right to counsel in at least some types of matters.
On its face, this argument seems too good to be true. Have
American states really adopted English common law-and related
old English statutes-as their law? Is such incorporation taken se-
riously?' If this argument is solid, why has it not been truly tested,
let alone accepted by a court?
In fact, this argument for resurrection of the English right to
counsel appears to have been argued in American courts four
times." In one case, the litigant advancing the argument cited old
English law as ancillary support for the right to counsel, rather
than direct authority.9 In the other three cases, the parties asserted
a right to counsel directly under English law, the litigants diluted
5. SeeLassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-34 (1981).
6. See, e.g., James A. Bamberger, Confirming the Constitutional Right of Meaningful Access
to the Courts in Non-Criminal Cases in Washington State, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC.JUST. 383, 392-93
(2005); John McKay, Federally Funded Legal Services: A New Vision of Equal justice Under Law, 68
TENN. L. Rav. 101, 104-05 (2000); Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the
Montana Constitution: Parental Rights as the Starting Point, 66 MONT. L. REV. 81, 84-89 (2005).
7. Such adoption or incorporation is often referred to as "receiving" the common
law. See, e.g., In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, 749 P.2d 324, 332 (Cal. 1988) ("Cal-
ifornia adopted the riparian system of water rights when it received the common law in
1850."); Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. v. Warren, 246 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Wis. 1976) ("Alien land
laws pre-date our Declaration of Independence; they became part of the fabric of state law
as the colonies received the common law from England."). This Article primarily refers to
this phenomenon as "incorporating" English law, rather than "receiving" it, because "receiv-
ing" tends to obscure the fact that states chose to adopt law that did not necessarily apply.
8. The authors are aware of one case each from the States of California, Florida, Mar-
yland, and Washington. See infra notes 9-11.
9. Brief for Appellant at 19-21, King v. King, 174 P.3d 659 (Wash. 2007) (No. 57831-
6-1) [hereinafter Brief for King].
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the argument by presenting it as one of several bases on which the
court could grant relief.'
This hesitant approach may reflect not only a lack of faith in the
strength of the argument, but also the difficulty in providing the
historical detail necessary to convince a court to resurrect long-
dormant law." Even academic commentators, unconstrained by
word limits and other considerations of appellate advocacy, have
barely scratched the surface regarding the potential incorporation
and application of the English right to counsel in America." Not
surprisingly, the courts that squarely considered the argument all
relied on historical uncertainty as a reason to reject the English
right to counsel. One court particularly worried about practical
concerns, such as when the right attaches and how long it contin-
14ues.
This Article attempts to fill in some of the missing history re-
garding the English right to counsel. Numerous sources confirm
that this right was neither a myth nor a relic, but a right long rec-
ognized and invoked in English courts through well-established
procedures addressing practical concerns. Beginning in colonial
days, some American courts recognized and applied the English
right to counsel and continued to do so after independence. Even
states that did not exist at independence acknowledged the English
right, though they had never been subject to English rule.
Civil Gideon arguments based on old English law thus seem to
deserve more respect and consideration than they currently re-
ceive. Whether the English right to counsel applies in the various
states depends upon whether and how each state has incorporated
English law. But the history recounted in this Article should dispel
10. See Hunt v. Hackett, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456, 457-58 (Ct. App. 1973); In re Amendments
to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 573 So. 2d 800, 802-03 (Fla. 1990); Brief for Appellant at
29-59, Frase v. Barnhart, 840 A.2d 114 (Md. 2003)(No. 6, Sept. Term 2003) [hereinafter
Brief for Frase].
11. Cf Brief for King, supra note 9, at 21 (citing nothing apart from 11 Hen. 7, c. 12,
an old English statute discussed infra at Part III); Brief for Frase, supra note 10, at 33-42
(citing eight sources, apart from 11 Hen. 7, c. 12).
12. See, e.g., Debra Gardner, justice Delayed Is, Once Again, justice Denied: The Overdue
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REv. 59, 60-61 (2007); Raven Lidman, Civil
Gideon as a Human Right: Is the U.S. Going to join Step With the Rest of the Developed World, 15
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 769, 773-74 (2006); David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Law-
yer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 735, 745-49 (1980).
13. See Hunt, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 457-58; Frase, 840 A.2d at 130 n.10; King, 174 P.3d at
667. In a Florida case, which took the form of a rule petition to the Florida Supreme Court,
the court acknowledged the petitioners' argument that Florida law incorporates the English
right to counsel and then simply ignored it. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar,
573 So. 2d at 802.
14. Frase, 840 A.2d at 130 n.10.
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most doubts regarding the existence and scope of, and the proce-
dures employed under, the English right to counsel.
It is also worth pointing out the "originalist" flavor of Civil Gide-
on arguments based on the old English right to counsel. Such
arguments do not rely on abstract principles of justice or fairness,
but on a developed body of real law from England. Courts are not
called upon to invent new rights, but simply to perpetuate (or re-
vive) old ones. This may be more attractive to history-minded
judges, similar to the originalism-inspired revival of the Confronta-
tion Clause in the U.S. Supreme Court.'5 The English right to
counsel may likewise appeal to judges who worry about circumvent-
ing the democratic process. By the terms of many states'
incorporation statutes, the legislature can modify or repeal incor-
porated English law, as it could any other aspect of common law.
The legislature thus has the final word.
This Article proceeds as follows: in Part I, we briefly discuss vari-
ous types of English law incorporation statutes throughout the
United States, and show that they are not a dead letter, as some
might suppose. In Parts II and III, we present a historical analysis
of the English right to counsel, and demonstrate that courts have
long recognized it in England (Part II), and in America (Part III).
Part IV delves into potential issues raised by attempting to apply
the old English right to counsel today. Although such issues and
their resolutions will vary from state to state, Part IV argues that
courts should have broad discretion when implementing the right,
as they would in dealing with any common law right. Accordingly,
little basis remains for many of the historical and practical worries
some have expressed about a modern American revival of the old
English right to counsel.
I. ENGLISH LAW INCORPORATION IN AMERICA
By constitution or statute, many American states have incorpo-
rated English common law into their domestic laws. Most of these
incorporation provisions contain three common elements: (1) a
statement of the incorporated authority (i.e., only the common
law, or the common law and statutes "in aid thereof'); (2) a dis-
claimer that English authority does not control if it contradicts
local constitutions or laws, or is no longer "applicable"; and (3) a
statement that the legislature can abrogate otherwise applicable
15. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-50 (2004).
[VOL. 45:3638
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English authority. 6 Many of these incorporation provisions also
contain a specific date (e.g., July 4, 1776), indicating that the Eng-
lish authority-as it existed in the colony at that time-controls. 7
As a matter of perpetuating the still-cherished "rights of Eng-
lishmen," and as a matter of continuity, incorporation made sense
for states that had been British colonies.' 8 As other states joined the
Union, however, they also incorporated English law, despite the
lack of continuity with British colonial rule. Some states reached
even farther back in time, before the beginning of colonial rule.
For example, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Wyoming
adopted English common law and related English statutes enacted
"prior to the fourth year ofJames the First,"" that is, before 1607.20
16. ALA. CODE § 1-3-1 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-119 (West 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 22.2 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 2-4-211 (West 2009); DEL. CONST. sched., § 18, as
interpreted by Steele v. State, 151 A.2d 127, 130 (Del. 1959); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (West
2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 1-1-10(c)(1); HAW. REV. STAT. § 1-1 (2010); IDAHO CODE. ANN.
§ 73-116 (2010); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-1 (West
2000); MD. CONST., art. 5(a)(1) (2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (West 2010); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 1-1-109 (2010); NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-101 (2010); NEV. REv. STAT. § 1.030 (2009);
N.H. CONST., part 2, art. 90 (2010), as interpreted by State v. Rollins, 8 N.H. 550 (1837); 1 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1503(a) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-3-1 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50
(2010); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-
1 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-200 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 271 (2010); WASH.
REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.04.010 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-1-1 (West 2010); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 8-1-101 (2010).
17. See MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 5(a)(1) (2010); 1 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1503(a) (2008) (noting that English common law and English statutes in force as of May
14, 1776 are in force within the colony). See generally Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common
Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 573-74 (2006) (discussing how disagreements over
such dates affected the Founding-era debate over whether there existed a federal common
law based on English precedent).
18. See, eg., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
23-25 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERI-
CAN IAW 95-96 (1973); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860 at 4 & n.18 (1977); Harry W.Jones, Our Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV.
443, 445 (1975); Bernard C. Steiner, The Adoption ofEnglish Law in Maryland, 8 YALE L.J. 353,
354, 361 (1899).
19. See COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211 (West 2009); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1
(West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-1-2-1 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.010 (West 2010);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-101 (2010).
20. The "fourth year of James the First" began on March 24, 1606 and ended March
23, 1607. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1 note (West 2010). But Illinois and Colorado
courts have routinely marked the fourth year ofJames the First as 1607. See, e.g., Chilcott v.
Hart, 45 P. 391, 395 (Colo. 1896); Amman v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953). These
particular statutes' apparent origin in Virginia law may explain why they refer to "the fourth
year of James the First"-the year in which the Jamestown colonists set sail for the New
World. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, Illinois' common law adoption statute
came by way of the Indiana territory, which itself borrowed the statute from a Virginia colo-
nial enactment of May 1776 establishing the pre-160
7 
requirement for English statutes.
Bulpit v. Matthews, 34 N.E. 525, 526 (Ill. 1893). Colorado later borrowed Illinois's statute.
Chilcott, 45 P. at 397. Missouri may have also borrowed from its neighbor, Illinois, and Wyo-
ming may have borrowed from its neighbor, Colorado.
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Today, common law incorporation statutes (or constitutional
provisions) remain on the books in at least twenty-seven states, and
these statutes are not a dead letter. The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals, for instance, held in 2006 that the English common law age
of consent to marriage-fourteen for males and twelve for fe-
males-governs common law marriage in Colorado." In 1994, the
Utah Court of Appeals held that the state attorney general possess-
es the powers of attorneys general under English common law.
And in Florida, the legislature may not, without a powerful reason,
abolish a tort cause of action derived from English common law."
Accordingly, Civil Gideon proponents have reason to argue that
old English law provides modern Americans (in some states, at
least) with a right to court-appointed counsel when indigent. In
states that did not begin as British colonies, the argument is even
stronger because incorporating English law was not a matter of
continuity (and therefore potentially subject to desuetude), but a
deliberate choice to incorporate law that was already very old. As
the Montana Supreme Court emphasized:
To whatever extent [English common law] has been in force,
it was and is ours by adoption and not by inheritance. The
territory embraced within this state was not a British posses-
sion in colonial days, and came under the influence of the
common law only by virtue of an act of the first legislative as-
sembly... .2
That first legislative assembly met in 1864-65 in Bannack, Mon-
tana -a gold-driven boomtown (nearly forgotten today) nestled in
the Bitterroot Range, thousands of miles from both England and its
former colonies on the East Coast. Presumably, a Civil War-era terri-
torial legislature on the American frontier would not haphazardly
21. In re Marriage ofJ.M.H., 143 P.3d 1116,1118-20 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
22. State v. Robertson, 886 P.2d 85, 89-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff'd, 924 P.2d 889
(Utah 1996).
23. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973). Florida courts continue to apply this
holding. See, e.g., Kish v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 930 So. 2d 704, 706 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
24. State ex rel. Metcalf v. District Court, 155 P. 278, 279 (Mont. 1916). But see S. Pac.
Co. v. Porter, 331 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. 1960) (noting that "Texas was never a British colony
nor an American territory and the common law comes to us by adoption rather than by
inheritance, so to speak[,]" but emphasizing that the adoption statute "[is] not construed as
referring to the common law as applied in England in 1840 [when the Republic of Texas
first enacted the adoption act], but rather to the English common law as declared by the
courts of the various states of the United States").
25. Robert L. Housman, The First Tenitorial Legislature in Montana, 4 PAc. HIST. REV.
376 (1935).
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choose to incorporate old English law if it did not intend its courts
to take English law seriously.
II. THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Although arguments based on old English law may succeed in
cases involving arcane areas such as common law marriage or the
powers of the attorney general, we suspect that old English law is
rarely used to support rights-based systemic change, such as a civil
right to counsel. Before incorporating a right of such importance,
courts will likely require extensive historical support. Yet, as far as
we are aware, no case arguing for the English right to counsel (nor
any academic treatment) has presented the history in sufficient
detail to overcome the courts' understandable skepticism about
the continuing viability of old English law regarding a civil counsel
right.
The research presented in this Part demonstrates that the Eng-
lish right to counsel was real, widely recognized, and well
developed. It had common law, statutory, and equitable incarna-
tions. Standardized procedures eventually developed to govern its
application. By the time that treatise writing came into vogue in
the English bar in the 1700s and 1800s," the English right to civil
counsel was seemingly as well developed as the Sixth Amendment
right to criminal counsel in America today. Modem American state
courts should not shy away from the English right to counsel on
account of historical obscurity.
A. 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 and Antecedents
In 1495, Parliament noted the King's concern for "poor subjects
[who] be not of ability nor power to sue according to the laws of
[the] land for the redress of injuries and wrongs to them daily
done."" The King "will[ed] and intend [ed] indifferent justice to
be had and ministered according to his common laws to all his true
subjects as well to poor as rich,"6 and Parliament responded with a
26. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
27. A. W. B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Form
ofLegal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 632, 653 (1981).
28. An Act to Admit Such Persons as Are Poor to Sue in Forma Pauperis, 1495, 11
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statutory right to counsel-and a waiver of court fees-for indigent
civil plaintiffs:
[Elvery poor person or persons which have [and] hereafter
shall have cause of action or actions against any person or
persons within the realm shall have, by the discretion of the
Chancellor of this realm, for the time being writ or writs orig-
inal and writs of subpoena according to the nature of their
causes, therefore nothing paying to your Highness for the
seals of the same, . . . [a] nd that the said Chancellor for the
same time being shall assign . . . Counsel learned by their dis-
cretions which shall give their Counsels nothing taking for the
same, and in like wise the same Justices shall appoint attorney
and attorneys for the same poor person and persons and all
other officers requisite and necessary to be had for the speed
of the said suits to be had and made which shall do their du-
ties without any rewards for their Counsels' help and business
30in the same ....
Some sources indicate that 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 codified preexisting
judge-made rights found in common law and other courts. Justices
in Eyre-medieval circuit riders assigned by the king to dispense
his justice in England's various counties -received petitions for
appointed counsel as early as 1292." Some sources indicate that
English ecclesiastical courts were appointing counsel for paupers
as early as 1295." Writing in the 1800s, a number of English judges
opined that 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 was "confirmatory of the common
law."30 Eminent English legal historian William Holdsworth confi-
30. Id.
31. See]. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 16 (2002); William
Craddock Bolland, Introduction, in 30 THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY XV-XiX
(William Craddock Bolland ed., 4th ed. 1914).
32. BOLLAND, supra note 31, at xlviii, 21. See alsoJohn MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and
Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. REv. 361, 367-68 (1923); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litiga-
tion, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1322, 1326 & nn.26-27 (1966).
33. JAMES THOMAS LAW, FoRMs OF ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 34 n.2 (London, Saunders &
Benning 1831) (quoting a rule laid down by the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1295 that
"advocates and proctors, and other officers in the Ecclesiastical Court, in the case of pau-
pers, should render their services gratis"). See also Maguire, supra note 32, at 365.
34. Brunt v. Wardle, (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 1254, 1257 (Com. Pl.) (Tindal, C.J.) ("[I]s
the 11 H. 7, c. 12, any thing more than confirmatory of the common law? ... [A] case is
referred to that occurred ... twenty years before the passing of that act, from which it ap-
pears that .. . the officer was bound to enter [an indigent plaintiffs pleadings] gratis . . . .");
see also Pitcher v. Roberts, (1842) 2 Dowl. P.C., N.S. 394, 400 (Q.B.) (Patteson,J.) (stating, in
the context of a dispute over court costs, "It appears to me to be clear that a pauper may be
admitted to sue as such under the statute 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, perhaps even at common law
. . . ."); 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 192 (A. Wood Renton & Max A. Robert-
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dently recounted that, as early as 1471, the King's Bench could
compel serjeants-at-law-the most elite English attorneys at that
time-to plead for poor persons.' Accordingly, it appears that the
principles embodied in 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 existed at common law in
at least some form before passage of the statute.
Although 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 initially extended only to civil plain-
tiffs at law, courts of equity subsequently adopted the right to
counsel and extended it to defendants," likely as early as 1570."
Thus, indigent civil plaintiffs at law, and both plaintiffs and de-
fendants in equity, could obtain counsel under 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 or
its judge-made equitable equivalent. This right to counsel had
enough prominence to catch Blackstone's attention. In his famous
Commentaies, he verified that 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 entitled "paupers" to
"counsel and attorney assigned them without fee."38 Indeed, the
term "informa paupeis" became a shorthand reference to the rights
granted by 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
B. Available Causes of Action
The statute 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 did not restrict its applicability to
any particular causes of action. The only portion of the statute ar-
guably addressing that issue is the preamble's description of the
king's concern for the "wrongs ... daily done" to poor persons "as
well concerning their persons[,] their inheritances[,] as other
causes [J.]" 40 But published decisions demonstrate that the English
courts applied the right to counsel in a variety of actions, including
wrongful death, ' debt,42 ejectment, 4 assumpsit,44 probate,4'5 and
son eds., 1907) ("[The] common-law right [to appointed counsel] was affirmed by the Stat-
ute 11 Henry vii. c. 12.").
35. Shapiro, supra note 12, at 746 n.48.
36. EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY 232 (Boston, Charles C. Little &James Brown 1846).
37. Book Note, Monro's Acta Cancellarie, 7 L.R. & Q.J. OF BRIT. & FOREIGN JURIS. 259,
267 (1848) (reviewing CECIL MONRO, ACTA CANCELLARIE (1847)).
38. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *400.
39. See5 MATrHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 297-
300 (London, A. Strahan 1798); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *400; DANIELL, Supra Dote
36, at 43-47; HENRY JAMES HOLTHOUSE, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 196 (Boston, Charles C.
Little &James Brown 1850).
40. An Act to Admit Such Persons as are Poor to Sue in Forma Pauperis, 1495, 11 Hen.
7, c. 12 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816) (spelling modernized).
41. Dooly v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1860) 121 Eng. Rep. 217 (Q.B.).
42. O'Hare v. Reeves, (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1415 (Q.B.).
43. Doe v. Owens, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 574 (Exch.).
44. Casey v. Tomlin, (1840) 151 Eng. Rep. 733, 734 (Exch.).
45. Bland v. Lamb, (1820) 37 Eng. Rep. 680 (Ch.).
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false imprisonment." The English ecclesiastical courts-which for
centuries governed bills for divorce--would also grant appointed
counsel under circumstances similar to that of the courts of law
and equity.48 The only cause of action for which an indigent plain-
tiff could not obtain appointed counsel appears to be "an action
on the case for words" (i.e., defamation)49 and perhaps legal mal-
practice.o
C. Procedure
1. Screening Meritless Claims or Unworthy Plaintiffs
Sir Francis Bacon, writing in 1622, denigrated 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 as
a law "whereby poor men became rather able to vex than unable to
sue."' Available sources indicate, however, that English courts of
law and equity developed relatively standard rules to screen vexa-
tious suits and not-poor-enough plaintiffs.
The most important screening mechanism was a relatively
standardized application to invoke the right: a two-part application
for prospective plaintiffs in law or equity, or a one-part application
for defendants in equity. The first part of the application (for
plaintiffs only) comprised a petition with a short statement of the
case and an attorney's certification that the plaintiff had a merito-
46. Anonymous [Trevanion], (1702) 88 Eng. Rep. 1535 (K.B.).
47. BAKER, supra note 31, at 490-96.
48. See LAW, supra note 33, at 34 (stating that paupers not worth five pounds will have
"an advocate and proctor" assigned to them); see also id. at 62-64 (elaborating on in forma
pauperis procedures); LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF MAR-
RIAGE AND DIVoRCE 300 (Philadelphia, John S. Littelt 1841) ("[a] person may be admitted
in forma pauperis if he swears that he is not worth 5L, his debts being paid"). But see infra
notes 55-57 (discussing the five pound threshold in law and equity). Following the Matri-
monial Causes Act 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85, the in forma pauperis threshold increased to
twenty-five pounds. JOHN FRASER MACQUEEN, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON DIVORCE AND
MATRIMONIAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE ACT OF 1857 AND NEW ORDERS 164 (London, Ste-
vens & Norton 1858).
49. 5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 300; 16 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL
ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQuITY 2591 (London, n.p. 1793). Certain sources also state that
11 Hen. 7, c. 12 did not apply to an action for penalties. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM TIDD ET AL.,
THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 97 (Philadelphia,
Robert H. Small 1856). The purported authority for this statement is Hawes v. Johnson,
(1826) 148 Eng. Rep. 566 (Exch. of Pl.). Hawes discussed the issue, but left it open and de-
cided the case on other grounds. Id. at 567.
50. See infra Part 1II.C.5.
51. FRANCIS BACON, The Historie of the Raigne of King Henyy the Seventh (1622), reprinted
in 6 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 23, 161 (London, Longman & Co. 1858).
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rious cause of action." The court could then reject the application
if the petition appeared meritless on its face," although some
courts developed the "custom ... [of] rely[ing] entirely upon the
certificate of counsel" as proof of merit.54
The second part of the application (for plaintiffs and defend-
ants) was an affidavit swearing that the poor person's net worth was
less than five pounds, exclusive of clothing." The origin of the five-
pound requirement at common law is not clear, but the courts of
equity borrowed the practice from common law as early as 1584,
meaning the common law courts had likely adopted it some time
before. 6 Once adopted, the five-pound threshold remained un-
changed for hundreds of years. 7
If satisfied that the case had merit and the applicant was suffi-
ciently poor, the court appointed an attorney to represent the
litigant." One treatise writer stated that a pauper's court-appointed
counsel could not refuse to serve "unless he satisfie [d] the Court
... that he ha [d] some good reason for his forbearance [.]"5
52. 5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 298 (practice at law); DANIELL, supra note
36, at 45 (practice in equity). At least one source states that the indigent litigant needed the
certification of two attorneys, rather than one, and that the indigent litigant's petition need-
ed to specify the attorney whom he or she wished the court to assign. 16 VINER, supra note
49, at 2591. The opposing party was not permitted to see the attorney's certification. See
Sloane v. British Steamship Co., Ltd., [1897] 1 A.C. 185, 186 (Q.B.) (citing Bryant v. Wag-
ner, (1839) 7 Dowl. 676).
53. 6 EPHRAIM A. JACOB, AN ANALYTICAL DIGEST OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
COURTS OF COMMON LAw, DIVORCE, PROBATE, ADMIRALTY AND BANKRUPTCY, AND OF THE
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURT OF APPEAL OF ENGLAND 9844 (New York, John C.
Remick 1884).
54. Hawes, 148 Eng. Rep. at 567.
55. 5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 298 (practice at law); DANIELL, Supra note
36, at 45, 232-33 (practice in equity).
56. See Book Note, supra note 37, at 268 & n.3. Charles Petersdorff, writing in 1831,
stated that the earliest instance he found of a wealth threshold in the common law courts
was ten pounds, rather than five. 13 CHARLES PETERSDORFF, A PRACTICAL AND ELEMENTARY
ABRIDGMENT OF THE CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH,
COMMON PLEAS, EXCHEQUER, AND AT NISI PRIUS 189 n.t (New York, W.R.H. Treadway &
Gould & Banks 1831). See also Maguire, supra note 32, at 376 n.83 (opining that reported
instances of a ten-pound threshold are probably mistakes).
57. See Book Note, supra note 37, at 267 (noting that, as of 1848, the five-pound
threshold was still the requirement, and encouraging revising it upward so that "a much
larger class of persons ... can . . . take advantage of the statute of Henry VII"); see also infra
note 79 and accompanying text.
58. See Dooly v. Great N. Ry. Co., (1854) 119 Eng. Rep. 131, 132 (Q.B.); 1 TIDD ET AL.,
supra note 49, at 97.
59. DANIELL, supra note 36, at 47.
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2. Proper Parties
Not every poor person, otherwise qualified, could sue in forma
pauperis. A married woman could not sue "as of course."60 One
treatise interprets this case as requiring that a married woman's
application to sue informa pauperis "must be special."" And at least
two English equity cases held that a litigant could not sue in forma
pauperis as an executor or administrator. 2
3. Consequences of Failure
Suing in forma pauperis was not a risk-free affair, at least not after
1531. In that year, Parliament enacted a statute requiring unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs to reimburse the opposing party's court costs. 3
Although the statute provided that poor plaintiffs "admitted ... to
have their process and counsel of Charity . . . shall not be com-
pelled to pay any costs," it nonetheless directed that such plaintiffs
"shall suffer other punishment as by the discretion of the Justices
orJudge ... shall be thought reasonable."6 4
Numerous sources indicate that this "other punishment" was
perverse: a choice between paying costs anyway or whipping and
pillory. Matthew Bacon's treatise, for instance, states that "if [the
pauper] be dispaupered or non-suited, the . . . usual practice is to
tax the costs, and for non-payment to order him to be whipped.",65
Another source states "if the matter shall fall out against the Plain-
tiff, he shall be punished with whipping and pillory.""" This source
further states that a female litigant was ordered flogged under this
practice in 1596, but it contains nothing about whether the order
60. Coulsting v. Coulsting, (1845) 50 Eng. Rep. 182, 182 (Ch.).
61. HUBERT AYCKBOURN & THOMAS H. AYCKBOURN, THE NEW CHANCERY PRACTICE
375 (London, Henry Butterworth 1846).
62. Oldfield v. Cobbett, (1845) 41 Eng. Rep. 765, 766 (Ch.) ("[I]n no instance has the
privilege ever been exercised either by a Plaintiff or Defendant suing in a representative
character, as executor or administrator."); Paradice v. Sheppard, (1745) 21 Eng. Rep. 220,
220 (Ch.) ("[T]he indulgence intended poor persons not of ability to sue for their rights in
forma pauperis, extends only to persons suing in their own rights, and not as executor or
administrator. . . .").
63. 23 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1531), reprinted in 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 380 (1817) (spelling
modernized).
64. Id.
65. 5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 300.
66. Drennan v. Andrew, (1866) 1 Ch. App. 300, 301 n.7 (quoting the reportedly stand-
ard form of an order admitting a plaintiff to sue inJorma pauperis).
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was executed. 7 And on at least one occasion, it appears that a pau-
per was excused from flogging after standing in the pillory.&
But unlike the five-pound threshold, which persisted for hun-
dreds of years, the practice of whipping and pillory (to the extent it
actually happened) seemingly fell into disuse. Many of the sources
that mention the possibility also doubt its continuing vitality. In
1698, Lord Chief Justice Holt denied a request to whip a non-
suited pauper, stating "he had no officer for that purpose, and
never knew it done."" Matthew Bacon adds, "upon consideration
of the circumstances of the case, it is in the discretion of the court
to spare both [taxation of costs and whipping]."" And according to
Blackstone, although "it was formerly usual to give such paupers, if
non-suited, their election either to be whipped or pay the costs ...
though that practice is now disused.""
4. Appeals
The English courts disagreed about paupers' appellate rights. In
equity, it appears settled that a pauper could appeal. At law, how-
ever, the right may not have existed. In 1677, ChiefJustice North of
the King's Bench stated that "[a] man admitted in forma pauperis is
not to have a new trial granted him; for he has had the benefit of
the King's justice once, and must acquiesce in it. We do not suffer
them to remove causes out of Inferior Courts."7 3 North's referral
to a "new trial" seems to reflect the fact that, at common law, an
"appeal" did not exist in the modern sense; and the closest analo-
gy-suing out a writ of error-"was generally held to signal the
commencement of a new suit."" Courts of equity, by contrast,
viewed appeals as a continuation of the same cause, similar to
75modern practice.
67. Id.
68. Book Note, supra note 37, at 268.
69. Anonymous, (1698) 91 Eng. Rep. 433, 433 (KB.).
70. 5 BACON & GWILLIM, supra note 39, at 300 n.b.
71. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at *400.
72. See Drennan v. Andrew, (1866) 1 Ch. App. 300, 302-03 (concluding that paupers
could appeal, although admitting that the historical record was ambiguous); see also id. 301-
03 n.7 (summarizing historical controversy over paupers' right to appeal in the court of
chancery).
73. Anonymous, (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 873 (KB.); see also 5 BACON & GWILLIM, SuLbTa
note 39, at 300.
74. Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150, 154 (Ind. 1992) (emphasis added).
75. Id.
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5. Ineffective Assistance and Malpractice
No located authority indicates that a pauper could bring a case
against his appointed attorney for the equivalent of what American
law now calls ineffective assistance of counsel. But at least one case
suggests that a pauper plaintiff could bring something like a mal-
practice action against his attorney-although that malpractice suit
could not itself be in forma pauperis. In 1850, the Queen's Bench
ruled on a case in which a plaintiff admitted in forma pauperis in a
separate suit sought recovery from his attorney in that suit for the
"costs of the day" the pauper was forced to pay, allegedly because
of the attorney's misconduct.' 6 Whether the plaintiff could sue his
attorney for compensation was not at issue. Rather, the Court ex-
amined whether the pauper was excused from paying costs in the
action against his attorney-in essence, whether he could prose-
cute the malpractice action in forma pauperis. The Court held that
the pauper was not excused.7 If English courts followed this deci-
sion, they would have effectively barred poor persons from suing in
forma pauperis in a malpractice action.
D. Repeal of 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 in England
In 1883, Parliament repealed 11 Hen. 7, c. 12. In its place, the
English courts provided by rule that paupers could be "admitted in
the manner heretofore accustomed," including the need for attor-
ney certification and an affidavit of poverty, but raised the poverty
threshold to twenty-five pounds.7" These rules preserved the court's
discretion to appoint counsel.o Through various subsequent rules
and statutes, the availability of civil counsel at no or reduced cost
(depending on a litigant's financial situation) continues in Eng-
76. Bell v. Port of London Assurance Co., (1850) L.J. Rep. (n.s.) (Q.B.) 89, reported in 2
ENGLISH REPORTS IN LAw & EQUITY 193 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1851). The conduct
remains unspecified. The attorney may have failed to prepare adequately for trial, thus re-
quiring a continuance. Under such circumstances, the pauper plaintiff could be ordered to
pay the "costs of the day for not proceeding to trial[.]"JOHN GRAY, A TREATISE OF THE LAW
OF COSTS 261 (London, Edward Lumley 1853).
77. 2 ENGLISH REPORTS IN LAW & EquITy, supra note 76, at 193.
78. Statute Law Revision & Civil Procedure Act 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., c. 49, Schedule.
79. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, Ord. XVI, rr. 22-24, reprinted in CHARLES BUR-
NEY ET AL., WILSON'S PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 183-84 (London,
Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1888). But the five-pound threshold may have been such a staple of
common culture that an apparently ill-informed legal advice columnist cited it as a
requirement as late as 1895. "Lex," The Penny Lawyer, THE PENNY ILLUSTRATED PAPER &
ILLUSTRATED TIMES, Sept. 7, 1895, at 159 (advising a correspondent, "[y]ou can proceed in
forma pauperis if you are not in possession of E5").
80. BURNEY ET AL., supra note 79, at 184.
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land in modified form to this day, with participation of both pub-
licly employed solicitors as well as private solicitors reimbursed by
the government.8'
III. THE ENGLISH RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICA
The English right to counsel, whether based in judge-made law
or the statute of 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, has a long history in England. But
according to one commentator writing in the 1970s, "This idea was
not exported to America.",2 This unsupported statement is wrong:
various aspects of the English right to counsel have been widely
recognized in America, with express reference to 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
This section summarizes the various ways that the English right has
been applied in colonial, state, and federal courts.
A. Colonial and State Courts
When British colonists came to America, they brought the Eng-
lish right to court-appointed counsel with them. Colonial
Maryland, for example, granted counsel under 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 on
a number of occasions. North Carolina relied on 11 Hen. 7, c. 12
from its colonial days until the statute was superseded by a state
legislative code in 1883.84 In 1808, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that the statute survived the end of colonial rule," and
as recently as 1985, a Pennsylvania court applied the statute to
determine whether a plaintiff deserved court-appointed counsel.8'
In 1845, a Georgia researcher under commission from the state
81. SeeJoan Mahoney, Green Forms and Legal Aid Offices: A History ofPublicly Funded Legal
Services in Brtain and the United States, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 223, 226-29 (1998).
82. Stephen K. Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: A History and Bibliography of Legal
Aid in America, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 755 (1976).
83. See WILLIAM KILTY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS EXISTED AT THE
TIME OF THE FIRST EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, AND WHICH BY EXPERIENCE
HAVE BEEN FOUND APPLICABLE TO THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 229 (Annapo-
lis, Jehu Chandler 1811) (reporting application in 1664 and 1672); CARROLL T. BOND,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS FROM 1695-1729 303 (1933) (reporting
a case from 1721 where the court appointed counsel to persons who swore themselves worth
less than five pounds).
84. Allison v. S. Ry. Co., 40 S.E. 91, 94 (N.C. 1901) (Purches, C.J., concurring); see also
I THE CODE OF NORTH CAROLINA 1 (1883).
85. See Madden v. City of York, 59 Pa. D. & C. 2d 367, 369-70 (Ct. C.P. York Cnty.
1972).
86. See Zerr v. Scott, 39 Pa. D. & C. 3d 459, 460-61 (Ct. C.P. Berks Cnty. 1985).
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legislature included 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 among those statutes remain-
ing in force in that state.
New states-those that had never been British colonies-
adopted 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 as well. Indiana's in forma pauperis statute
"was copied [from II Hen. 7, c. 12] early on by pioneer Hoosier leg-
islators eager to establish for [their] state a respected and humane
system of justice.""' The statute existed verbatim in Florida's code
as late as 1941."
Some states, without addressing the right to counsel, adopted 11
Hen. 7, c. 12's fee-waiver right." California did so in 1917, in the
process quoting both the fee-waiver and right-to-counsel provisions
of the statute.9' Today, California courts continue to acknowledge
I I Hen. 7, c. 12 as the source of Californians' in forma pauperis
rights, and have expanded upon those rights with regard to ex-
penses a litigant must normally pay up front."
Delaware's Chancellor Allen, citing 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, similarly
held (in 1987) that the persistence of English common law in Del-
aware law gave him inherent authority to waive court costs "in a
proper case."" Chancellor Allen set forth two factors to consider:
(1) "the court should be satisfied that the plaintiff is in fact impe-
cunious"; and (2) "the court must assess the allegations of the
complaint to assure itself that, assuming the facts alleged to be
true, a substantial claim is asserted and that the matter pressed is
not frivolous or vexatious."9 4 Chancellor Allen cited no authority
for these factors, but they mirror the requirements established by
English courts administering 11 Hen. 7, c. 12.
In Rhode Island, pre-17 50 English statutes "relating to the poor"
remain in force in the state, and the state's supreme court held
that this includes the cost-waiving provisions of 11 Hen. 7, c. 12,
though it did not address the right to counsel. 9 The Washington
Supreme Court cited 11 Hen. 7, c. 12, among other authorities, as
supporting the notion that courts have inherent power to waive
court fees.99
87. WILLIAM A. HOTCHKISS, A CODIFICATION OF THE STATUTE LAW OF GEORGIA, IN-
CLUDING THE ENGLISH STATUTES IN FORCE 594 (Savannah,John M. Cooper 1845).
88. Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150,153 (Ind. 1992).
89. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 573 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla.
1990).
90. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
91. Martin v. Superior Court, 168 P. 135, 137 (Cal. 1917).
92. See, e.g., Baltayan v. Estate of Getemyan, 110 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (Ct. App. 2001).
93. In re Application of Motivational Center, Inc., 1987 WL 14626, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov.
3, 1987).
94. Id. at *2.
95. Jones v. Aciz, 289 A.2d 44, 50 (R.I. 1972).
96. SeeO'Connor v. Matzdorff, 458 P.2d 154, 159-60 (Wash. 1969).
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Finally, many states with their own in forma pauperis statutes have
looked to 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 for interpretive guidance. Indiana natu-
rally did so, having intentionally copied the statute. Tennessee
also did so as early as 1826.98 And the NewJersey Supreme Court of
Judicature held in 1836 that 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 governed the proce-
dure for making an application to sue under New Jersey's in forma
pauperis statute.99
B. Federal Court
Given the prevalence of English right to counsel in state courts,
it should not be surprising to find that the statute was also known
in the federal courts. In 1894, for example, the D.C. Circuit dis-
cussed 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 in the context of an attempt to appeal in
forma pauperis, which the court ultimately rejected.90 In 1904, a con-
victed criminal similarly petitioned the Seventh Circuit to appeal his
conviction in forma pauperis. The court analyzed the potential statu-
tory sources of authority for such appeals, beginning with the
statute of Henry VII:
By 11 Hen. VII, c. 12, every poor person having a cause of ac-
tion against another could have writs according to the nature
of his cause without payment of fees, and assignment of coun-
sel by the court, who should act for him without reward. This
statute came to us as part of the common-law existing at the
time of the Revolution. It is followed as well by the federal as
the state courts, unless the matter is otherwise regulated by
the Congress of the United States or by the Legislature of the
respective states."o
After analyzing the other available statutes, the Court concluded
that a convict could not appeal in forma pauperis under federal
law. 102
Tennessee federal courts, like their state counterparts,to0 had
substantial experience with the English right to counsel, much of it
97. See Harrison v. Stanton, 45 N.E. 582, 583 (Ind. 1896) (citations omitted); see also
Campbell v. Criterion Group, 605 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind. 1992).
98. See Philips v. Rudle, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 121, 122-23 (1826); see also Brumley v. Hay-
worth, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 421, 421-22 (1832); Andrews v. Page, 49 Tenn. 634, 636 (1870).
99. Sears v. Tindall, 15 N.J.L. 399, 402-03 (1836).
100. Ex parte Harlow, 3 App. D.C. 203 (D.C. Cir. 1894).
101. Bristol v. United States, 129 E 87, 88 (7th Cir. 1904).
102. See id. at 89-90.
103. See cases cited supra note 98.
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through Judge Eli Shelby Hammond.'0 4 Bradford v. Bradford, an
1878 decision from the Western District of Tennessee (in which
Judge Hammond concurred) may have been the first instance of
its mention. 5 There, a plaintiff sought to sue informa pauperis. The
plaintiff did not seek appointment of counsel, but only waiver of
posting bond for costs. The court worried that if a plaintiff could
proceed without posting bond, the plaintiff could easily bring vexa-
tious suits. No on-point federal law existed, but:
[t]he rule of the English courts adopted and acted on by
some of the American courts, commends itself to our judg-
ment as being best calculated to protect this court as well as
defendants against frivolous and harassing litigation. If the
applicant will supplement his affidavit by the certificate of any
reputable attorney of this court, to the effect that he has in-
vestigated the case and believes the applicant has a good
cause of action, he will be permitted to bring and prosecute
his suit in forma paupers. 06
By requiring an attorney's certificate, the court replicated the pro-
cedure called for by English courts administering the right to
counsel.
Ten years later, the Western District of Tennessee issued another
opinion referring to English practice regarding in forma pauperis
suits. The court, per Judge Hammond, faced an application by an
"infant" to sue in forma pauperis. Judge Hammond noted that the
applicant had "present[ed] a certificate of a good cause of action
by a reputable attorney, as required by our ruling in Bradford v.
Bradford."o' But Judge Hammond went on to deny the application,
stating that an infant could not sue in forma pauperis in Tennessee
under either Tennessee law or English common law practice, even
though English courts of equity would allow it.0 The rule at law,
said Judge Hammond, prevented irresponsible next-friends from
too easily co-opting infants' legal claims. 1o
104. Judge Hammond served as a federal judge in the Western District of Tennessee
from 1878-1904. See Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federaljudges, http://
www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=962&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=n (last visited Oct. 30,
2011).
105. See Bradford v. Bradford, 3 F. Cas. 1129 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1878).
106. Id. at 1129.
107. Roy v. Louisville N.O. & T.R. Co., 34 F. 276, 276 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1888) (citation
omitted).
108. See id. at 277-78.
109. See id.
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In 1899, Judge Hammond issued yet another opinion regarding
11 Hen. 7, c. 12 when he faced a plaintiff s pro se application to ap-
peal.no Believing the plaintiffs case to be meritless, Hammond
stated his desire to deny the application,"' but he could find no
authority permitting denial simply because the judge believed the
appeal to be meritless." Hammond therefore relied on the court's
inherent authority to protect itself from meritless suits. He also
noted that the court's practice of "protect[ing] defendants against
the oppression of vexatious suits . . . grew up in every court under
the statute of 11 Henry VII. c. 12.""1 Hammond stated that the
English statute was "as unqualified as any of our American statutes
in granting the privilege [to sue informa pauperis]," and then quot-
ed the operative language from the English statute, including its
provision for counsel." 4 Hammond later stated that "[clounsel
might have been assigned in this case if the plaintiff ... had not
also taken care to indicate that he was himself a lawyer capable of
managing it professionally.""
Hammond wrote in the wake of an 1892 federal statute that gave
the court discretion to assign counsel if the court "deem[ed] the
cause worthy of a trial." 16 A federal practice treatise predating the
1892 federal statute referred to 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 as the source of
the right to sue in forma paupeis.'17 As late as 1920, subsequent edi-
tions of the same treatise, although acknowledging the relevant
federal statute, continued to cite 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 as the origin of
the American right to sue informa paupeis."s
IV. MODERN "APPLICABILITY," PARTIAL
INCORPORATION AND DISCRETION
Under most states' common law adoption statutes, an old Eng-
lish rule of law must remain "applicable" to modern conditions
before it can be considered a part of local law. Ultimately, each
110. Brinkley v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 95 E 345, 348 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1899).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 350.
113. Id. at 353.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 353-54.
116. See Act ofJuly 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252.
117. See 1 ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE IN CIVIL CAUSES § 200
(Boston, Boston Book Co. 1892). Foster's second edition was completed in January 1892, see
id. at vi, and presumably published shortly thereafter. The federal in fortma pauperis statute
was enacted onJuly 20, 1892. See 27 Stat. at 252.
118. See 2 ROGER FOSTER, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL PRACTICE § 413 (1920) (governing
petitions for leave to sue informa pauperis).
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state will interpret "applicability" in its own way, but certain com-
mon themes exist-at least concerning inapplicability. For
example, courts have held that old English rules are inapplicable if
they do not make sense in that state's unique geography and cli-
mate."9 Courts have also refused to accept English rules based on
outdated notions of public policy.120 And courts have rejected
English rules that no longer comport with modern scientific un-
derstanding.12' In general, courts agree on the maxim that a
common law rule no longer applies when the reasons for its mak-
ing no longer apply, or are no longer considered valid.122
Arguments that the English right to counsel remains "applica-
ble" in modern America appear consistent with these principles.
Nothing about geography, climate, or modern science is germane
to the right-to-counsel question. And the provision of counsel is
not based on outdated notions of public policy; it is consistent with
the move toward greater legal protections for the rights of indi-
gents. Certainly the need that prompted Parliament to enact 11
Hen. 7, c. 12-providing the poor with a means of redressing
"wrongs . . . daily done"' 2 -has not ceased to exist.
In some cases, the details of applying the English right to coun-
sel, rather than its general purpose, may conflict with local public
119. See, e.g., San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Fresno Flume & Irri-
gation Co., 112 P. 182, 183 (Cal. 1910) (rejecting English common law riparian rights
because of the need for irrigation in California); Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425, 427-29
(1880) (holding that, in light of Colorado's aridity and the need for cattle to roam as freely
as possible to obtain sufficient food and water, the English rule that a farmer had no obliga-
tion to fence his fields does not apply in Colorado).
120. See, e.g., Good v. Good, 311 P.2d 756, 759-60 (Idaho 1957) (refusing to apply an
English rule that did not comport with the state's policy of legal equality between husband
and wife); Shaughnessey v. Jordan, 111 N.E. 622, 626 (Ind. 1916) (noting that early English
law restricting workers' strikes "[was] hostile, not only to the statute law of this country, but
to the spirit of our institutions" (internal citations omitted)); United Ass'n ofJourn. & App.
of Plumbing, etc. v. Stine, 351 P.2d 965, 972-78 (Nev. 1960) (holding that English common
law rule proscribing prospective arbitration clauses is not applicable in Nevada, given mod-
ern public policy in favor of easing burdens on commerce).
121. See, e.g., Lovato v. District Court, 601 P.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Colo. 1979) (abandoning
the English common law definition of death in light of modern science).
122. See, e.g.,Jews ForJesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1103-04 (Fla. 2008) ("Florida
adopted the English common law as it existed on July 4, 1776 ... [but] [wie have explained
that the common law must keep pace with changes in our society and may be altered when
the reason for the rule of law ceases to exist. . . ." (citation omitted)); Morton v. Merrillville
Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that although Indiana has
adopted the English common law, a common law rule "should be discontinued" "when the
reasons for a rule of law cease to exist"); Bernot v. Morrison, 143 P. 104, 106 (Wash. 1914)
("[C]ourts ... will not blindly follow the decisions of the English courts as to what is the
common law without inquiry as to their reasoning and application to circumstances.").
123. See An Act to Admit Such Persons as are Poor to Sue in Forma Pauperis, 1495, 11
Hen. 7, c. 12 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816) (spelling modern-
ized).
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policy. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of the English courts' admin-
istration of the right raises many questions for modern
implementation. Must an indigent litigant get an attorney's certifi-
cation of merit? In which causes of action does the right to counsel
attach? Is the right still restricted to plaintiffs at law, but open to
both plaintiffs and defendants in equity?
These questions are important,1 but they should not preclude
courts from recognizing the underlying right, given the flexibility
courts have in determining how old law applies in modern con-
texts. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, rejected the
notion that incorporation of an English rule or statute necessarily
means wholesale incorporation of every particular. In 1902, the
Court held that the statute of 43 Eliz., c. 4, enacted in 1601, gov-
erns charitable trusts in Colorado "so far as it recognizes or
indicates what are charitable uses, and in so far as it gives validity to
gifts for such uses[, but] the details of the statute, and the reme-
dies provided therein, are not applicable to our conditions or
institutions, and are not in force here."l25 Seemingly, to the extent
that the "details" of an English rule of law do not fit in modern
contexts, courts need not adopt them.
Similarly, nothing in any English law incorporation statute that
we are aware of requires that a rule, once incorporated, cannot be
modified through case-by-case adjudication. This seems particular-
ly true where states have incorporated common law and statutes in
support thereof. Rules incorporated under these statutes have his-
torically been subject to continued refinement by both English and
American courts. At the very least, a court applying English law
should not be afraid to do as the English courts did with respect to
11 Hen. 7, c. 12 and create procedural requirements suitable to the
times.
Finally, English law incorporation statutes usually recognize the
state legislature's authority to repeal incorporated English law. To
the extent the courts establish a system that the legislature finds
unworkable, the legislature has the final word. A court worried
about overstepping its authority by recognizing the English right to
counsel in America might therefore take comfort from the
124. The question of where to get attorneys is especially thorny. See, e.g., REGINALD
HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 100-01 (1919); Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pm
Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 255, 272-79 (1981);
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 739-62; Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Court Appointment of Attorney to
Represent, Without Compensation, Indigent in Civil Actions, 52 A.L.R.4TH 1063 (1987).
125. Clayton v. Hallett, 70 P. 429, 434 (Colo. 1902) (relying on a previous codification of
CoLo REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-211).
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legislature's ability to make the ultimate determination regarding
whether the right should continue in force.
CONCLUSION
In states that incorporated old English law, many other rights
besides the right to counsel may be lurking in the "mists of early
English [legal] history."1 26 Nonetheless, if litigants argue for old
English law, they should not do so halfheartedly. An abbreviated
argument on a historically rich issue is a disservice to the court, is
unlikely to succeed, and may create bad precedent.
Such should not be the case with the English right to counsel.
Whether the English right still applies in any particular state turns
on the requirements of that state's English law incorporation stat-
ute. At the very least, however, the existence and application of a
civil right to counsel under old English law has substantial histori-
cal support. It therefore deserves serious consideration as the
primary argument in support of Civil Gideon efforts. Perhaps more
importantly, it reframes the Civil Gideon debate. Rather than an
attempt to create a novel right, Civil Gideon can be legitimately
seen as seeking to revive and perpetuate historically established
rights-an area of common interest for many judges, regardless of
ideological persuasion.
126. Quail v. Municipal Court, 217 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366 (Ct. App. 1985) (Johnson, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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